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Abstract
Democratic backsliding has multiplied “unprincipled” political principals: governments with 
weak commitment to the public interest. Why do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guer-
rilla sabotage to thwart policies against the public interest under “unprincipled principals,” yet 
others do not? Despite its centrality in contemporary governance, this conundrum has not seen 
quantitative research. We address this gap with survey evidence from 1,700 Brazilian public ser-
vants during the Temer Presidency, widely perceived to lack democratic legitimacy and integrity. 
We focus on one key explanator: public service motivation (PSM). We argue that bureaucrats with 
greater PSM are more likely to engage in voice and sabotage of “unprincipled policies,” and exit 
to avoid implementing “unprincipled policies.” Structural equation models support these hypoth-
eses. Public service-motivated bureaucracies are thus short-run stalwarts against “unprincipled” 
political principals. Over time, they look to depart, however, leaving “unprincipled” principals a 
freer hand to pursue policies against the public interest.
  
Abstract
A onda de retrocessos democráticos ao redor do mundo multiplicou o número de principals 
políticos “sem princípios,” ou seja, governos com fraco compromisso com o interesse público. 
Por que alguns burocratas se engajam em voz e sabotagem para frustrar políticas públicas 
contra o interesse público adotadas por esses principals, e outros burocratas não? Apesar de 
sua centralidade no debate contemporâneo, este questionamento ainda não foi explorado em 
pesquisa quantitativa. Endereçamos essa lacuna trazendo evidências de um survey respondido 
por 1.700 servidores públicos federais brasileiros durante a presidência de Temer, amplamente 
percebida como desprovida de legitimidade democrática e integridade. Nos concentramos em 
uma explicação principal para responder a pergunta acima: motivação para o serviço público 
(Public Service Motivation - PSM). Argumentamos que burocratas com maior PSM são mais 
propensos a se engajar em voz e sabotagem em relação à “políticas públicas sem princípios,” e 
a sair da administração para evitar implementar “políticas públicas sem princípios.” Modelos de 
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são, portanto, baluartes de curto prazo contra principals políticos “sem princípios.” Com o tempo, 
eles procuram se afastar da administração, deixando, no entanto, os referidos principals “sem 
princípios” mais livres para perseguir políticas públicas contra o interesse público.
Introduction
“President Trump is facing a test to his presidency un-
like any faced by a modern American leader,” wrote 
an anonymous author, later revealed to be Trump 
Homeland Security appointee Miles Taylor, to the New 
York Times. Taylor was referencing many public of-
ficials who “have vowed to do what we can to pre-
serve our democratic institutions while thwarting 
Mr. Trump’s more misguided impulses until he is out 
of office” (The New York Times 2018). A  subset of 
public officials within Trump’s own administration 
thus sought to frustrate a presidential agenda which 
they perceived as undemocratic, unjust, and against the 
public interest.
These actions were what O’Leary (2013, xi) classic-
ally called guerrilla government: “the actions taken by 
public servants who work against the wishes—either 
implicitly or explicitly communicated—of their su-
periors.” Guerrilla government attests to the power of 
public officials, their ability to go against the will of 
political principals, and their motivation to perform 
what they are convinced is ethical, appropriate, and 
right. In principal-agent terms, guerrilla bureaucrats 
conceive of themselves as “principled agents” who seek 
to convince “unprincipled” principals of “principled 
policies” (voice) and, when this fails, seek to exploit 
principal-agent problems in bureaucracy to thwart the 
policies of “unprincipled” political principals (guerrilla 
sabotage).
Democratic backsliding—an increasing number 
of populist governments and governments with 
weak commitment to ethical values and the public 
interest—has multiplied “unprincipled political princi-
pals” around the world (Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
Freedom House (2021), for instance, notes that 75% 
of the world’s population lives in countries experien-
cing democratic declines. This proliferation of “un-
principled principals” arguably enhances the relevance 
in contemporary governance of “principled bureau-
cratic agents” who are willing to engage in voice and 
guerrilla sabotage to preserve good government.
A core task for public administration scholarship is 
thus to assess the causes of guerrilla bureaucracy. Why 
do some bureaucrats engage in voice and guerrilla 
sabotage to thwart policies they perceive to be against 
public interest under “unprincipled principals,” yet 
others do not? Despite the centrality of this research 
question in times of democratic backsliding, there has 
been hardly any quantitative research on guerrilla bur-
eaucracy in public administration.1
Building on O’Leary’s (2013) classic qualitative work 
on guerrilla government, scholarship on whistleblowing, 
and the management literature on constructive deviance, 
our study helps address this gap. We focus on one poten-
tial cause and research question in particular—namely 
whether public service motivation (PSM) shapes guer-
rilla activity. Our focus is motivated by the importance 
of PSM in public administration scholarship (cf. Ritz, 
Brewer, and Neumann 2016) and practice (Perry 2020), 
as well as findings from prior studies on PSM and eth-
ical behavior, which suggest that PSM might potentially 
represent a potent explanator of guerrilla behavior.
Theoretically, we argue that bureaucrats with greater 
PSM are more likely to engage in both voice and sabotage, 
seeking to convince “unprincipled” principals of “prin-
cipled policies” (voice) and to frustrate the implementation 
of “unprincipled policies” (sabotage). However, we also 
expect them to be more likely to leave (exit) to avoid con-
tributing to the implementation of “unprincipled policies.”
Empirically, we provide evidence for our argument 
through an original survey of over 1,700 public ser-
vants in Brazil’s Federal Government in 2017, during 
the Michel Temer Presidency. The Temer Presidency is 
a propitious case for studying bureaucratic responses 
to “unprincipled” political principals. President Temer 
had come to power when the democratically elected 
President—Dilma Rousseff—was impeached in a pro-
cess which many observers deemed undemocratic and 
a legislative coup (Taub 2016; Watson 2017). A month 
before our survey, Temer was caught on tape appearing 
to engage in bribery (Phillips 2017; Watts 2017). After 
leaving office, Temer was detained on corruption, rack-
eteering, and obstruction of justice charges (Bloomberg 
2019). In September 2017, the last month of our survey, 
Temer’s approval rating had fallen to 3% in some polls 
(Marcello 2017; Verdélio 2017). The former Brazilian 
President thus both lacked democratic legitimacy and 
was engaged in a range of policies and actions against 
the public interest in office—from corruption to ob-
struction of justice. Our survey can thus shed light on 
how career bureaucrats in Brazil’s Federal Government 
1 To our knowledge, Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander’s (2020) study is 
the sole exception. Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander (2020) assess 
the characteristics of policies and contexts (such as the probability 
of harm to society) which make bureaucrats rebel. We assess the 
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react to “unprincipled” political principals and pol-
icies. It does so through an original measurement scale 
of O’Leary’s (2013) guerrilla sabotage activities.
In line with our predictions, we find, using struc-
tural equation models (SEM), that bureaucrats with 
greater PSM are more likely to engage in voice, sabo-
tage, and exit when tasked with implementing policies 
they perceive to be against the public interest.
Our findings suggest that public service-motivated 
bureaucracies act as a stalwart against “unprincipled” 
political principals. This stalwartness, however, ap-
pears to come with an expiration date. Public service-
motivated bureaucrats also disproportionately intend 
to leave when working under “unprincipled political 
principals.” Political decay thus appears to trigger bur-
eaucratic decay. With more public service-oriented 
bureaucrats more intent on leaving, bureaucracies on 
average become more “unprincipled,” leaving “un-
principled” principals a freer hand to pursue policies 
against the public interest, without clandestine sabo-
tage or protest by bureaucrats. Our findings thus 
contribute both theoretically and empirically to the 
scholarly understanding of the determinants of guer-
rilla bureaucracy, and the role of PSM in explaining 
exit, voice, and sabotage under “unprincipled” prin-
cipals. Our findings also underscore the feasibility of 
studying guerrilla sabotage quantitatively, including by 
developing and validating a new measurement scale 
for guerrilla sabotage. We encourage others to repli-
cate this scale to better understand guerrilla bureau-
cracy in comparative perspective.
The Determinants of Guerrilla Bureaucracy
Why do some bureaucrats engage in guerrilla activ-
ities to thwart policies against the public interest under 
“unprincipled principals,” yet others do not? Three 
strands in the literature offer insights and inform 
our hypothesis development: the literature on guer-
rilla government, the management literature on con-
structive deviance, and studies of whistleblowing and 
ethical behavior in public sector organizations, in par-
ticular of PSM and ethical behavior.
Classically, O’Leary (2013) popularized “guerrilla 
government” in public administration scholarship. In 
her account, guerrilla government arises from bureau-
crats “who are dissatisfied with the actions of public 
organizations [and] programs,” and sabotage them 
“clandestinely” (O’Leary 2010, 8). Principal-agent 
problems in bureaucracy—high levels of discretion 
of bureaucratic agents coupled with imperfect moni-
toring by managerial and political principals—enable 
such guerrilla sabotage by bureaucrats.
In cases of dissent, guerrilla sabotage is only one 
of several courses of action available to bureau-
crats. Among others, bureaucrats may choose to 
raise concerns about the policy with their principals 
(voice), leave the organization to avoid helping im-
plement the “unprincipled” policy (exit), or, alterna-
tively, implement the policy faithfully despite their 
concerns (loyalty) (cf. Hirschmann 1970). Beyond 
active responses (exit, voice, and sabotage) and loy-
alty (implementing the policy faithfully), bureau-
crats may also respond with what Brehm and Gates 
(1997, 30) label “dissent shirking”: “not working be-
cause one is opposed to a particular policy output.” 
Brehm and Gates (1997, 30) juxtapose this to sabo-
tage as “the production of negative output.” The 
dividing line between sabotage and shirking (i.e., 
non-implementation) can be blurred, however, as 
non-implementation can sabotage a policy. As de-
tailed below, O’Leary (2013, 108) thus includes non-
implementation among guerrilla sabotage actions. 
We follow O’ Leary’s (2013, 2019) foundational 
work on guerrilla government, and thus conceptu-
alize alternative responses to unprincipled principals 
as sabotage (including dissent shirking), voice, exit, 
and, lastly, loyalty (as the residual alternative if none 
of the other courses of action are taken).2
While the motivations driving guerrillas can be di-
verse, according to O’Leary (2013), bureaucrats tend 
to prioritize guerrilla tactics when alternative courses 
of action are either costlier or ineffective and, most 
of all, when “unprincipled” policies violate a public 
servant’s perceived ethical obligations—that is their 
understanding of what is morally right and wrong.
Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander (2020) pro-
vide quantitative (conjoint) evidence for several of 
O’Leary’s (2013) assertions about the characteristics 
of policies which make bureaucrats rebel—such as the 
probability that the policy causes harm, that public 
servants would face retribution for rebelling or that it 
violates a public servant’s ethical standards. However, 
as Waldo’s (1980) map of the ethical obligations of 
public servants—which O’Leary (2013) draws on—
underscores, public servants’ ethical standards—their 
understandings of what is morally right and wrong—
can differ as different public officials react to different 
ethical obligations. To understand guerrilla bureau-
cracy in government, we thus need to understand not 
only the characteristics of policies that make bureau-
crats rebel, but also the characteristics of rebelling bur-
eaucrats themselves. Our hypotheses address this gap.
The management literature on constructive devi-
ance—focused mostly on private sector enterprises—
complements this insight by shedding light on the 
2 In our empirical analyses, our findings about the effects of PSM 
on sabotage are equally robust when conceptualizing sabotage in 
omission of Brehm and Gates’ (1997) dissent shirking, that is, without 
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psychological mechanisms underlying constructive de-
viance. Contrary to the public administration literature 
on guerrilla government, it offers significant large-n 
evidence. Vadera, Pratt, and Mishra’s (2013) review, 
for instance, comprised 152 articles. Constructive devi-
ance is thereby understood as “intentional behaviours 
that depart from the norms of a reference group [often 
management] in honourable ways,” wherein honor-
able acts are those that improve the human condition 
and impact society at large (Spreitzer and Sonenshein 
2003, 209).
Constructive deviance is proximate to, though not 
equal to, guerrilla government as conceptualized in 
O’Leary (2013). For O’Leary (2013), guerrillas need 
not engage, or be motivated by, “constructive” devi-
ance, but can instead engage in “destructive deviance” 
guerrilla activity, including for petty, self-interested 
concerns. As we are concerned with bureaucratic re-
sponses to “unprincipled” political principals, we 
follow the management literature and limit our scope 
of inquiry to explaining not all guerrilla activity, but 
only guerrilla sabotage motivated by “constructive de-
viance” concerns.
The dividing lines between “constructive” and “de-
structive” deviance and “principled” and “unprin-
cipled” principals can, of course, be blurry. Policies 
bureaucrats perceive as “unprincipled” need not be. 
Instead, bureaucratic perceptions may simply reflect 
value conflicts between bureaucrats and political prin-
cipals and diverging views of what the “public interest” 
constitutes given the multitude of public values (see, 
e.g., Gailmard 2010; Jensen, Andersen, and Jacobsen 
2019). Political principals may, in a democratic society, 
prioritize specific values over others, without this neces-
sarily being unprincipled (cf. Jørgensen and Bozeman 
2007). Bureaucrats’ superimposition of their own 
value preferences over those of elected political princi-
pals through guerrilla sabotage may thus run counter 
to and undermine—rather than further—democratic 
norms and the public interest (cf. O’Leary 2013). In 
other words, it may constitute “destructive” rather 
than “constructive” guerrilla sabotage. However, pol-
itical principals may also pursue policies which are 
not in the public interest—for instance to enrich them-
selves personally—and, where they do, guerrilla ac-
tivity is arguably a form of constructive deviance. With 
our Brazilian data detailed below, we plausibly assess a 
case of this nature, and can thus bracket these norma-
tive concerns by empirically assessing guerrilla activity 
under an “unprincipled” political principal.
Beyond this conceptual clarification of constructive 
deviance, the management literature sheds light on 
three underlying psychological mechanisms of con-
structive deviance: intrinsic motivation, felt obligation, 
and psychological empowerment (cf. Vadera, Pratt, 
and Mishra 2013). Intrinsically motivated employees 
find constructive deviance more rewarding, for in-
stance by taking risks to impact society positively (e.g., 
Eisenberger and Aselage 2009).3 Constructive deviance 
is also more likely when employees feel an obligation to 
deviate, for instance because of their attitude towards 
their organization (e.g., Detert and Trevino 2010; 
Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, and Kamdar 2011). Finally, 
psychological empowerment can foster constructive 
deviance—for instance because of a more proactive 
personality (e.g., LePine and Van Dyne 2001).
While this literature thus underscores several at-
titudes, traits, and values which foster guerrilla ac-
tivity motivated by constructive deviance, the public 
administration literature on whistleblowing and eth-
ical behavior adds that PSM—a “particular form of 
altruism or prosocial motivation that is animated by 
specific dispositions and values arising from public in-
stitutions and missions” (Perry and Hondeghem 2008, 
3)—is, plausibly, a further important set of values and 
attitudes underlying guerrilla activity in government. 
To be clear, this literature has not focused on guerrilla 
sabotage as defined by O’Leary (2013). Rather, it has 
assessed other forms of constructive deviance, such as 
whistleblowing and the reporting of ethical problems. 
It has found not only that PSM has real behavioral 
consequences for, for instance, performance, prosocial, 
and honest behavior (Bellé 2013; Esteve et  al. 2016; 
Olsen et al. 2019) but also that it foments other forms 
of constructive deviance, including the reporting of 
ethical problems and whistleblowing (see, e.g., Brewer 
and Selden 1998; Caillier 2017; Cho and Song 2015; 
Lavena 2016; Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, and Schuster 
2019; Near and Miceli 2008). For these alternative 
forms of constructive deviance, PSM is identified as 
a potent explanator. For instance, Lavena’s (2016, 
128) study of a range of individual- and organizational-
level determinants of whistleblowing in the US Federal 
Government finds that “being norm-based and affect-
ively motivated to public service is the strongest sig-
nificant characteristic.” We take from this literature the 
importance of assessing PSM as a potentially potent 
determinant of guerrilla activity by bureaucrats.
In addition, we can build on theoretical mechanisms 
linking PSM and its four component dimensions—
self-sacrifice, commitment to public values, attraction 
to public service, and compassion4—to constructive 
deviance and ethical behavior. Ethical behavior—such 
3 Though the management literature utilizes the term “intrinsic 
motivation,” other scholars would refer to it as internalized extrinsic 
motivation, as it is targeted towards an external consequence (doing 
good to society) (cf. Vandenabeele 2007).
4 For congruence with our empirical test, we discuss the PSM dimensions 
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as whistleblowing—often requires self-sacrificing one’s 
interest (Wright, Hassan, and Park 2016). Ethical 
behavior is more consistent with one’s values where 
commitment to public values is high (Stazyk and 
Davis 2015). Ethical behavior and contributing to the 
common good is more meaningful to individuals at-
tracted to public service (Brewer and Selden 1998); 
and ethical behavior is more emotionally compelling to 
compassionate individuals, who are more sympathetic 
to the welfare of others (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, 
and Schuster 2019).
In conclusion, the “guerrilla government” litera-
ture suggests that bureaucrats engage in “guerrilla 
sabotage” when “unprincipled” policies violate their 
perceived ethical obligations. The management litera-
ture on constructive deviance adds certain attitudes 
and values—including intrinsic motivation and a felt 
obligation—matter, partly as they determine what 
bureaucrats see as their ethical obligation. Lastly, 
the literature on ethical behavior in public adminis-
tration points to PSM as an important explanator of 
constructive deviance, and offers several plausible the-
oretical mechanisms. In sum, prior works underscore 
that PSM could be a determinant of guerrilla bureau-
cracy and offer theoretical mechanisms to build on. 
They do not explicitly theoretically develop or quan-
titatively assess this claim, however. Our next sections 
address this gap.
PSM, Guerrilla Sabotage, Voice, and Exit in 
Times of Bad Government
To understand and explain how bureaucrats react to 
the proliferation of “unprincipled” principals around 
the world, we link PSM theoretically to three courses 
of action bureaucrats can take when faced with “un-
principled” principals: guerrilla sabotage, voice, and 
exit. Loyalty—the faithful implementation of policies 
of unprincipled principals—is arguably the residual al-
ternative when none of these three actions are taken 
(cf. Hirschmann 1970).
Consider, first, the relationship between PSM and 
guerrilla sabotage. Extrapolating from the literature 
reviewed above, all four PSM component dimensions 
may be expected to affect bureaucratic willingness to 
sabotage “unprincipled” principals. Bureaucrats with 
greater willingness to self-sacrifice for the common 
good may be expected to be more willing to take the 
risks for their own careers associated with clandes-
tinely sabotaging “unprincipled” policies. Bureaucrats 
with greater compassion may be expected to be more 
sympathetic to the welfare of those harmed by “unprin-
cipled” policies, and thus affectively drawn to guerrilla 
sabotage. Bureaucrats with greater commitment to 
public values have a stronger normative commitment 
to protecting the public interest and common good. 
Lastly, bureaucrats more attracted to public service 
may sabotage “unprincipled” policies for instrumental 
motives: they find it more meaningful and rewarding 
to engage in activities which advance the public 
interest, including sabotage of “unprincipled” policies 
(cf. Gailmard 2010). In short, all four PSM component 
dimensions suggest that bureaucrats with greater PSM 
become more “principled” bureaucratic agents, who 
are more likely to seek to sabotage “unprincipled” pol-
icies of principals. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  Bureaucrats with greater PSM 
are more willing to clan-
destinely sabotage “unprin-
cipled” policies of principals
All four PSM dimensions may, similarly, be expected 
to enhance voice against “unprincipled” policies: bur-
eaucrats voicing their objections with principals—in 
informal conversations, meetings or memoranda, for 
instance—to convince them to stop or modify “unprin-
cipled” policies (cf. Hirschmann 1970). When speaking 
out against “unprincipled” policies, bureaucrats openly 
signal to principals that they disagree with their pol-
icies. In return, they might face reprisals. Bureaucrats 
with greater willingness to self-sacrifice may be ex-
pected to be more willing to take this risk (cf. Wright, 
Hassan, and Park 2016). Likewise, bureaucrats with 
greater compassion, who are more sympathetic to the 
welfare of those harmed by “unprincipled policies,” 
could be expected to be more willing to voice their con-
cerns to principals (cf. Le Grand 2003). A commitment 
to public values in turn may be expected to norma-
tively compel bureaucrats to signal concern about “un-
principled” policies. Lastly, bureaucrats more attracted 
to public service may be expected to find it more mean-
ingful to raise voice against “unprincipled” policies. 
We thus expect a positive relationship with PSM:
Hypotheses 2 (H2):  Bureaucrats with greater 
PSM are more willing to 
attempt to convince princi-
pals to stop “unprincipled” 
policies
Lastly, we also expect a positive effect of all four 
PSM dimensions on bureaucratic resignations to 
avoid helping implement “unprincipled” policies. 
Bureaucrats more willing to self-sacrifice may be 
expected to be more willing to incur the personal 
costs—the loss of their jobs—of this course of ac-
tion. Bureaucrats with greater compassion may be 
expected to be more affectively motivated to resign 
to avoid implementing “unprincipled” policies which 
harm the welfare of others. Bureaucrats more com-
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driven to resign to avoid implementing “unprin-
cipled” policies which violate the values they are 
committed to. Lastly, bureaucrats attracted to public 
service may find implementation of “unprincipled” 
policies without meaning and thus become more in-
clined to resign (cf. Bright 2008). All four PSM di-
mensions thus give us reason to believe that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Bureaucrats with greater 
PSM are more willing to re-
sign to avoid implementing 
“unprincipled” policies of 
principals
Contrary to H1 and H2, however, the prediction for 
H3 is less clear-cut. If more “principled” bureaucratic 
agents (with greater PSM) intend to leave organiza-
tions when tasked with implementing “unprincipled” 
policies, bureaucratic agents in public sector organiza-
tions, over time, become less “principled” on average 
when tasked with implementing “unprincipled” pol-
icies. With fewer “principled” bureaucratic agents in 
organizations, fewer bureaucrats may be expected to 
engage in voice and guerrilla sabotage of “unprin-
cipled” policies. As a result, “unprincipled” principals 
face fewer principal-agent problems in public sector 
organizations when implementing “unprincipled” 
policies. They may thus become more able to imple-
ment “unprincipled” policies when “principled” agents 
leave—albeit only, of course, if those “principled” bur-
eaucratic agents do not have unique expertise princi-
pals need to implement their policies.
Where bureaucrats with greater PSM foresee this 
risk—that their departure would enhance the ability 
of principals to implement “unprincipled” pol-
icies—the effects of PSM on exit are less clear-cut. 
On the one hand, bureaucrats with high PSM are 
more willing to sacrifice their jobs and find “unprin-
cipled” policies juxtaposed to their commitment to 
public values, compassion with the welfare of others 
and what makes public service meaningful to them. 
This is reflected in H3. On the other hand, a greater 
commitment to public values—and thus protection 
of the public interest—and compassion with the wel-
fare of those harmed in the longer-run by “unprin-
cipled” policies might compel high-PSM bureaucrats 
to remain within the organization to curb, through 
sabotage and voice, “unprincipled” policies.5 These 
competing expectations put a premium on assessing 
H3 empirically.
Method and Data
We assess our hypotheses through original survey data 
from Brazil’s Federal Government. As noted, most 
prior studies of guerrilla sabotage in public adminis-
tration are qualitative in nature, providing fine-grained 
insights into guerrilla government and the ethics of dis-
sent (cf. O’Leary 2013; as detailed above, Hollibaugh, 
Miles, and Newswander [2020] is the one exception). 
We complement this evidence with large-n data on 
guerrilla sabotage, exit, and voice of bureaucrats under 
an “unprincipled” principal, which enables us to draw 
inferences about the particular role played by PSM.
We conducted our survey (a broader civil service 
management survey) in collaboration with Brazil’s 
Ministry of Planning, Development and Management 
(Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento 
e Gestão) and the National School of Public 
Administration (Escola Nacional de Administração 
Pública). Respondents were not compensated for par-
ticipation. Ethics approval for the survey was obtained 
at the University of Nottingham (January 18, 2017). 
Our survey was fielded during the Temer Presidency, 
between July 5 and September 23, 2017. As detailed 
in the “Introduction” section, focusing on an unelected 
political principal without democratic legitimacy, who 
engaged in widespread corruption and featured a 3% 
approval rating at the time of our survey,6 allows us 
to plausibly sidestep normative concerns about “prin-
cipled” or “unprincipled” principals by empirically 
assessing guerrilla activity under what is plausibly an 
“unprincipled” political principal. Our inferences are 
thus limited to the determinants of “constructive” 
guerrilla activity.
At the same time, the Brazilian context allows us 
to explore guerrilla activity in a traditional Weberian 
career public service, marked by significant bureau-
cratic autonomy. With the exception of managerial 
and advisory positions (Direção e Assessoramento 
Superior [DAS])—to which Presidents and Ministers 
do make several thousand appointments, thus consti-
tuting an important mechanism for political control 
of bureaucracy (Lopez and Praça 2018)—civil ser-
vants are recruited through written exams, employed 
on permanent contracts with strong protections from 
dismissal, and promoted based on years of service 
principally in practice (OECD 2010). In fact, even in 
higher-level positions (DAS 1–5) of the federal gov-
ernment, only 19% of bureaucrats indicate that pol-
itical alignment was important for their appointment, 
and only a minority have party affiliations, suggesting 
5 This would, however, only hold if high-PSM bureaucrats are “act-
irrelevant.” If they are “act-relevant”—that is, motivated not only by 
outcomes in the public interest, but by the warm glow of actions leading 
to those outcomes (cf. Le Grand 2003, 36)—high-PSM bureaucrats may 
exit when required to implement “unprincipled policies.”
6 By way of illustration, Bolsonaro—Brazil’s current highly controversial 
populist President—held an approval rating of 30% even after 
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relatively low levels of politicization of bureaucracy, 
particularly below the very senior echelons (Lopez 
and Praça 2018; Lopez and Moreira da Silva 2019). 
The majority of federal government civil servants 
are, moreover, members of unions, which frequently 
undertake collective action to protect employee rights 
(OECD 2010; Pichler and Menegotto 2015). When in-
quired about public service values, federal employees 
in Brazil—according to feedback of 58,000 officials—
prioritize values which are akin to public service values 
in other OECD countries, such as impartiality, integ-
rity and public service commitment (CGU 2021). As 
we discuss further in the conclusion, our findings are 
thus plausibly generalizable to other Weberian career 
civil services, such as those in continental Europe.
Our survey was conducted online on Qualtrics. 
The survey frame comprised all public servants 
in 14 federal government institutions based in 
Brasilia—26,616 public servants in total. We focused 
on public servants in Brasilia due to their greater 
proximity to the Temer Presidency.7 The sampled 
institutions cover a broad range of federal govern-
ment ministries and agencies: Ministry of Finance; 
Treasury; Tax Administration; Institute for Social 
Security; Ministry of Planning, Development and 
Management; Ministry of Industry and Commerce; 
Office of Comptroller General; Ministry of Social 
Development; Ministry of Environment; Ministry 
of Labour; Ministry of Transport, Ports and Civil 
Aviation; Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation; and Ministry of Cities.
3,999 public servants responded to the survey (15% 
response rate). 1,695 respondents completed all survey 
questions in both the PSM and guerrilla sabotage bat-
teries. Our respondents are diverse in gender, age, edu-
cation, rank, and years of experience (table 1). In line 
with the Weberian nature of Brazil’s career civil ser-
vice, 24% of respondents have been in public service 
for over 30 years, and an additional 17% have been in 
public service for over 20 years.
Comparing our respondents to survey popula-
tion data, we find they are roughly representative 
on gender and age, but more (university) educated 
than the average federal government bureaucrat 
(table 2).
While overrepresentation of more educated respond-
ents is typical in online surveys (Keeter and McGeeney 
2015), this overrepresentation and the relatively low re-
sponse rate implicate that we cannot claim that our re-
spondents are fully representative—though our sample 
significantly improves upon the representativeness of 
prior surveys of guerrilla bureaucrats.8 Descriptive in-
ferences—for instance about the prevalence of guer-
rilla activity among bureaucrats in Brazil—should thus 
be interpreted with caution, and this is a limitation of 
our article. While descriptive means may be affected, 
we do not see reason why the association between vari-
ables—and thus our core inferences—are biased by our 
response rate. With that said, as two duties of care, 
we include a range of controls to curb bias from lack 
of representativeness on observables, and, as detailed 
below, assess potential unobservable non-response bias 
by estimating whether PSM levels are higher for early 
survey respondents (who were plausibly more motiv-
ated to respond).
To ensure the meaning of our survey questions was 
well understood, we pre-tested our questionnaire ex-
tensively, including through revisions of survey items 
with staff in Brazil’s Ministry of Planning, Development 
and Management, and the National School for Public 
Administration, and 10 cognitive interviews with bur-
eaucrats across institutions and levels of hierarchy. 
Prior to these cognitive interviews—and as our PSM 
battery was developed in English—a professional 
translator translated survey items to foster congruence 
between the meaning of questions in Portuguese and 
English (see supplementary appendix 1 for PSM survey 
items in Portuguese). These duties of care increase 
7 In four institutions—Finance, Tax, Social Security, and the Comptroller 
General—our survey frame lacked information about the location 
of public servants. We thus invited all of their public servants to 
participate.









 60 or older 13%
Education  
 High school 8%
 Technical-vocational degree 2%
 Bachelor 39%
 Post-graduate studies 37%
 Master 11%
 PhD 3%





 Over 30 years 24%
8 Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander’s (2020) survey of federal 
bureaucrats in the United States had a 3.7% response rate (relative to 
the sampling frame), and only assesses representativeness relative to 
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confidence that respondents understood our measures 
in the intended fashion.
For our PSM measurement, we replicate the inter-
national PSM measurement scale developed by 
Kim et  al. (2013). While PSM measurement is char-
acterized by an ongoing debate (cf. Perry and 
Vandenabeele 2015), at least some consider Kim et al. 
the “current authority” (Prebble 2016, 2). Kim et al.’s 
measurement scale comprises four dimensions and 16 
items: self-sacrifice (SS), compassion (COM), commit-
ment to public values (CPV), and attraction to public 
service (APS) (table 3).
For our dependent variables—guerrilla sabotage, 
exit, and voice under “unprincipled policies”—by con-
trast, no measurement scale exists.10 We thus devel-
oped an original scale, drawing on O’Leary’s (2013, 
108) qualitative compilation of 30 “methods utilized 
by dissatisfied public servants to address perceived 
wrongs.” Her compilation includes actions of voice 
(such as “Confront the issue directly with the person 
involved”), exit (such as “Quit” or “Arrange for, or go 
along with, a transfer to another office”), and, most 
extensively, sabotage.
O’Leary’s (2013, 108–09) guerrilla sabotage ac-
tions fall conceptually broadly into at least four 
categories: clandestine disobedience and non-
implementation of the policy (e.g., “Neglect policies 
and directives you disagree with—stall,” “Fail to im-
plement orders you think are unfair,” “Obey your 
superiors in public, disobey them in private”); clan-
destine attempts to convince colleagues to disobey 
and not implement a policy (e.g., “Hold clandestine 
meetings to plot a unified staff strategy,” “Build part-
nerships among entities at all levels of government”); 
clandestine sabotage of policies inside a government 
agency (e.g., “Fail to correct superiors’ mistakes: let 
them fall”); and clandestine information to outside 
groups about the harm of a policy to enlist their sup-
port to stop the policy (e.g., “Leak information,” 
“Forge links with other outside groups: other profes-
sionals, nongovernmental organizations, concerned 
citizens,” “Ghostwrite letters, testimony, and studies 
for supportive interest groups”).
Table 2. Survey Representativeness
Survey Sample Survey Population Data9 (Federal Government)
Gender (percentage female) 43% 45%
Age (mean age) 47.6 46
Education (percentage university-educated) 90% 75%
Source: Government of Brazil (2018).
9 Survey population data is from 2018; our survey was conducted in 2017.
10 Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander’s (2020) conjoint experiment 
features outcome measures which include several of O’Leary’s (2013, 
108–09) guerrilla sabotage actions—without, however, offering a 
measurement scale of bureaucratic guerrilla activity.
Table 3. Survey Items: PSM Construct
Item ID Survey Item
Attraction to public service
 APS1 I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community
 APS2 It is important to contribute to activities that tackle social problems
 APS3 Meaningful public service is very important to me
 APS4 It is important for me to contribute to the common good
Commitment to public values
 CPV1 I think equal opportunities for citizens are very important
 CPV2 It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services
 CPV3 It is fundamental that the interests of future generations are taken into account when developing public policies
 CPV4 To act ethically is essential for public servants
Compassion
 COM1 I feel sympathetic to the plight of the underprivileged
 COM2 I empathize with other people who face difficulties
 COM3 I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly
 COM4 Considering the welfare of others is very important
Self-sacrifice
 SS1 I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society
 SS2 I believe in putting civic duty before self
 SS3 I am willing to risk personal loss to help society
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Our measurement scale of bureaucratic guerrilla ac-
tivity against perceived “unprincipled” policies reflects 
this four-fold categorization. We asked respondents 
how frequently they would undertake these four types 
of guerrilla actions on a five-point scale (“Never,” 
“Rarely,” “Sometimes,” “Often,” or “Always or almost 
always”; table 4; see supplementary appendix 2 for the 
items in Portuguese). This was preceded by a short de-
scription to embed these actions in a context of per-
ceived “unprincipled” policies:
“Imagine that management insisted public ser-
vants implement a government policy that you 
are convinced is against the interest of the public 
and could cause society significant harm. How 
frequently would you expect to react in the fol-
lowing ways?”11,12
This four-item measure of guerrilla sabotage was com-
plemented by one-item measures of voice (“I would 
try to convince management to stop the policy”) and 
exit (“I would quit my position if I had to implement 
the policy”). Our cognitive interviews suggest that 
respondents understood these items as intended as 
guerrilla sabotage, voice, and exit in contexts of per-
ceived “unprincipled” policies. As a limitation—and as 
in other quantitative studies of guerrilla government 
(Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander 2020)—our 
survey measures are only measures of behavioral in-
tent. We return to this limitation in the conclusion.
We analyze these data in an SEM framework.13 We, 
first, evaluate the fit of our latent constructs, PSM and 
sabotage, in a measurement model using confirmative 
factor analysis (CFA). Subsequently, we report results 
from SEMs in the “Results” section. For both ana-
lyses, as all items are measured on ordinal scales and 
as particularly the observed PSM items show signs of 
skew, we rely on the diagonally weighted least squares 
(DWLS) estimator. Across all models, we identify la-
tent variables using effects coding. This identification 
scheme utilizes constraints across factor loadings and 
item intercepts to identify latent variables and—which 
greatly eases interpretation of regression estimates—
to ensure that they are on the same scale as their 
indicators.
To evaluate model fit in both CFA and SEM, we 
rely on the comparative fit index (CFI) and the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with 
benchmarks for good fit of 0.95 (or above) and 0.06 
(or below), respectively (e.g., Hu and Bentler 1999). 
We also report chi-squared tests of model fit. However, 
as significance in this test is sensitive to large samples 
such as ours, we do not place too much emphasis on 
this measure of fit.
Beginning with our CFA, we test whether guerrilla 
sabotage and PSM are meaningful constructs in the 
Brazilian setting. Table 5 contains the path coefficients 
for the PSM measurement model. Alongside most prior 
works, we use a second-order reflective measurement 
model, rather than the sometimes discussed but rarely 
used first-order reflective, second-order formative 
measurement alternative (cf. Kim 2011; Mikkelsen, 
Schuster, and Meyer-Sahling 2020). The model fits 
the data well (χ 2  =  191.435 [df  =  100, p < .001], 
CFI = 0.991, RMSEA = 0.020). We, further, assessed 
11 Our scenario thus holds constant several policy and situational 
characteristics (such as the policy causing harm) which Hollibaugh, 
Miles, and Newswander (2020) associate with guerrilla activity.
12 In line with our ambition to assess guerrilla sabotage motivated by 
constructive deviance, we measure how bureaucrats respond to 
policies they perceive to be against the public interest and causing 
society significant harm in a context of a political principal that is 
“unprincipled.” In less extreme cases—with political principals that 
are less overtly “unprincipled”—legitimate value conflicts between 
bureaucrats and political principals about what the “public interest” 
is may, of course, arise (cf. O’Leary (2013). Our measurement scale 
replicated in such contexts would thus potentially measure guerrilla 
sabotage more generally (destructive or constructive), rather than 
guerrilla sabotage motivated by constructive deviance.
13 All analyses were conducted using the lavaan package for R (Rosseel 
2012).
Table 4. Survey Items: Guerrilla Sabotage, Exit, and Voice
Item ID Survey Item
 Imagine that management insisted public servants implement a government policy that you are convinced is against the interest of the 
public and could cause society significant harm. How frequently would you expect to react in the following ways?  
Guerrilla Sabotage
 GUER1 I would, in private, try to disobey and not implement the policy
 GUER2 I would, in private, try to convince colleagues not to implement the policy
 GUER3 I would, in private, try to find ways to undermine the implementation of the policy inside my agency
 GUER4 I would, in private, try to inform outside groups or the media about harm I thought the policy inflicted on society
Exit
 EXIT I would quit my position if I had to implement the policy
Voice
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the scale reliability of the four PSM component dimen-
sions. Ordinal alpha for every dimension is higher than 
standard benchmarks (0.91 for APS, 0.87 for CPV, 
0.85 for COM, and 0.88 for SS). Moreover, in terms 
of internal discriminant validity, a four-dimensional 
model performs better in terms of fit than a one-
dimensional model (Δχ 2 = 1001.140 [df = 4, p < .001], 
ΔCFI = 0.103, ΔRMSEA = 0.048). Lastly, we followed 
Kim et  al. (2013, 91)  and assessed the correlations 
between the four PSM dimensions. These range from 
0.365 (between CPV and SS) to 0.670 (between APS 
and COM), and are always significantly lower than 
1.00, providing evidence of discriminant validity by 
both the Kline’s (requiring correlations less than 0.85) 
and the Bagozzi et  al.’s (requiring significant differ-
ences from unity) criteria (Kline 2011). The PSM scale 
thus shows acceptable validity and reliability.
Similarly, we find acceptable validity and reliability 
of our novel four-item guerrilla sabotage scale. Ordinal 
alpha for the four items is above conventional bench-
marks (0.90), and the measurement model fits the data 
well (χ 2 = 0.864 [df = 2, p = .649]).14 Table 6 shows the 
estimated factor loadings of the construct.
To further assess the validity of our scale, we 
examined discriminant validity. A  plausible con-
jecture could be that we are simply measuring 
CPV using different items with our guerrilla bat-
tery. However, a comparison of models including 
SABOTAGE items as a separate construct and as part 
of CPV does not support this idea (Δχ 2 = 1,065.797 
[df = 4, p = .007], ΔCFI = 0.098, ΔRMSEA = 0.050). 
The successful validation of our scale suggests that 
future studies interested in measuring guerrilla bur-
eaucracy may benefit from replicating our guerrilla 
sabotage scale.
We control, in a baseline SEM, for the gender, univer-
sity education, income (measured in three income bands), 
years of work experience in public administration, rank in 
hierarchy (administrative assistant, technical-professional 
level, managerial level), position type (whether bureau-
crats are in contact with citizens in their job), and insti-
tution of the respondent. Controlling for age instead of 
years of experience yields similar results.15 Institutional 
fixed effects imply that all differences between institu-
tions are controlled for. Supplementary appendix 3 con-
tains descriptive statistics for our variables.
14 CFI and RMSEA are not reported as the χ 2 is smaller than the degrees 
of freedom and the two fit measures will, consequently, always indicate 
perfect fit. 15 Controlling for both leads, due to collinearity, to uninvertable matrices.
Table 5. PSM Measurement Model
Item Estimate Item Estimate
APS APS1 1.008 (.000) CPV CPV1 1.395 (.000)
 APS2 1.171 (.000)  CPV2 1.196 (.000)
 APS3 0.901 (.000)  CPV3 1.032 (.000)
 APS4 0.919 (.000)  CPV4 0.376 (.000)
COM COM1 1.280 (.000) SS SS1 1.038 (.000)
 COM2 1.235 (.000)  SS2 0.828 (.000)
 COM3 0.545 (.000)  SS3 1.069 (.000)
 COM4 0.940 (.000)  SS4 1.065 (.000)
PSM APS 1.067 (.000)    
 CPV 0.476 (.000)    
 COM 1.060 (.000)    
 SS 1.396 (.000)    
 N 2,363    
 χ 2 191.435 [df = 100, p < .001]   
 CFI 0.991    
 RMSEA 0.020    
 SRMR 0.044    
Note: Results from confirmatory factor analysis employing effects coding and estimated using DWLS; p values in parentheses.
SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.
Table 6. Guerrilla Sabotage Measurement Model
Index Item Estimate
SABOTAGE DISOBEY 1.065 (.000)
 CONVINCE 1.025 (.000)
 PREVENT 1.083 (.000)
 REPORT 0.827 (.000)
 N 1,857




Note: Results from confirmatory factor analysis employing effects 
coding and estimated using DWLS; p values in parentheses.
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Results
We present our results in three steps. First, we provide 
descriptive statistics on guerrilla sabotage, voice, and 
exit. They show that bureaucrats vary sharply in their 
willingness to engage in each of these actions in re-
sponse to “unprincipled” policies. Subsequently, we as-
sess the determinants of this variation and find support 
for our hypotheses. Lastly, we subject our findings to 
several robustness checks.
Figure 1 visualizes means for voice, exit, and sabo-
tage, all of which range theoretically from zero to 
four. It underscores, first, variation in bureaucratic 
responses to unprincipled policies. Congruent with 
O’Leary’s (2013) qualitative finding, sabotage is the 
least common response to “unprincipled” policies. 
Voice (convincing principals to amend policies) and, 
to a lesser extent, exit (quitting to avoid helping imple-
ment the policy) are more frequent.
In fact, only a minority of bureaucrats are willing 
to consistently engage in sabotage of “unprincipled” 
policies. Depending on the form of guerrilla sabotage, 
between 24.4% and 38.3% of respondents would be 
willing to undertake a given sabotage activity “Almost 
or Almost Always” or “Often” when faced with a gov-
ernment policy they are convinced is against the interest 
of the public and would cause society significant harm 
(figure 2). About 12.3% would be willing to engage at 
least often in all forms of guerrilla sabotage. Trying to 
convince colleagues not to implement the policy is the 
most frequent act of (willingness to) sabotage (38.3% 
at least “Often”), followed by informing outside groups 
or the media about harm of the policy (30.4% at least 
“Often”). Significantly fewer are willing to disobey and 
not implement the policy (25.1% at least “Often”)—
that is engage in what Brehm and Gates (1997) term 
dissent shirking—and even fewer are willing to find 
ways to undermine the implementation of the policy 
inside their agency (24.4% at least “Often”).
By contrast, most (64.3%) respondents are willing 
to engage in voice and try to convince management 
to stop the policy. Exit is less common than voice, but 
somewhat more common than sabotage: 33.7% of re-
spondents indicate that they would quit their position 
at least “Often” if they had to implement a policy they 
perceive to be against the public interest (figure 3; see 
supplementary appendix 3 for descriptive statistics).
Most bureaucratic agents are thus willing to take 
some actions (voice), but not others (exit and sabo-
tage) in response to “unprincipled” policies. Where 
bureaucrats are willing to engage in any form of sabo-
tage (at least “Often”), however, they typically seek to 
counter “unprincipled” policies through multiple chan-
nels: they are in their majority also willing to engage in 
voice (73.7% at least “Often”) and, to a lesser extent, 
exit (40.2% at least “Often”). Sabotage, voice, and exit 
are thus complementary, rather than alternative, forms 
of actions for guerrilla bureaucrats to counter “unprin-
cipled” policies. Vice versa, a significant minority of 
bureaucrats (7.5%) are plausibly loyal agents of “un-
principled” principals: they are never or rarely willing 
to engage in any form of voice, exit or sabotage.
What explains this variation in bureaucratic re-
sponses to “unprincipled” policies? Consistent with our 
hypotheses, PSM is one important determinant. Figure 2  
shows structural regression estimates for the association 
between PSM and exit, voice, and sabotage. The effects are 
significant at the 1% level. Substantively, a one-point in-
crease in PSM is associated with a 0.7-point increase (0.5 
SD) in the frequency of voice (on a 0–4 scale), a 0.5-point 
(0.3 SD) increase in the frequency of exit, and a 0.2-point 
(0.2 SD) increase in the frequency of sabotage (figure 4).
The estimates for other significant controls enhance 
confidence in the plausibility of our finding (see table 7). 
Respondents with more years of experience, closer to the 
end of their careers, are significantly more likely to exit 
(5% level), but not more likely to engage in voice or sabo-
tage. Managers are significantly less likely to sabotage (1% 
level), but significantly more likely to engage in voice (1% 
level) and exit (5% level)—a finding we return to below.16
We also find in separate regressions with the same 
control variables that each PSM component dimension 
is positively and significantly associated (at the 5% 
level) with greater voice, exit and, with the exception 
of CPV, guerrilla sabotage (figure 3; see supplementary 
appendix 4 for regression tables). At the same time, 
estimate sizes differ notably. In particular, APS is by a 
factor of 3.3–7.7 more strongly associated with sabo-
tage than other PSM dimensions (figure 5).17
To further gauge the importance of different 
PSM dimensions for exit, voice, and sabotage, we 
Figure 1. Means of exit, voice, and guerrilla sabotage by 
bureaucrats.
Note: 0–4 frequency scale: 0 = Never or Almost Never to 4 = Always or 
Almost Always.
16 Treating the unwillingness to engage in either exit, voice or sabotage 
as a measure of loyalty, we also find in a linear probability model that 
PSM is associated with significantly lower loyalty towards unprincipled 
principals (see supplementary appendix 10).
17 APS also has a significantly (at the 5% level) larger association 
with voice than compassion and self-sacrifice. We do not observe 
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regress these outcomes on all PSM dimensions sim-
ultaneously (supplementary appendix 5). This is 
suggestive only: since the dimensions are reflective 
indicators of the same second-order latent construct 
(PSM), analyzing them separately may erode statis-
tical support (though our analyses have acceptable 
variance inflation factors across outcome measures). 
With this caveat in mind, we find that only APS is 
Figure 2. Histograms of responses to guerrilla sabotage items.
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significantly associated with guerrilla sabotage 
when controlling for all PSM dimensions simultan-
eously. APS is also significantly associated with voice, 
whereas self-sacrifice is significantly associated with 
voice and exit. Cautiously, then, our analyses of PSM 
dimensions underscore the importance of APS in par-
ticular for guerrilla sabotage.
To mitigate concerns with spuriousness, we sub-
ject our core findings to several robustness checks. To 
begin with, to address potential omitted variable bias 
concerns, we assess whether our findings hold when 
additionally controlling for management and leader-
ship variables. While we control for institutional fixed 
effects—and thus differences in management across 
Figure 4. Regression results: PSM and exit, voice, and guerrilla sabotage.
Note: Structural regression estimates for PSM from a multivariate SEM, including all controls and ministry fixed effects. Estimates are shown with 
95% confidence intervals.
Table 7. Main Regression Results
Exit Voice Sabotage
PSM 0.495 (.000) 0.672 (.000) 0.194 (.000)
Gender 0.119 (.190) −0.132 (.078) 0.025 (.557)
Years of service 0.010 (.047) 0.006 (.136) −0.001 (.607)
Contacts with citizens −0.093 (.283) 0.112 (.121) 0.047 (.258)
University graduate −0.013 (.953) 0.247 (.203) −0.161 (.137)
Middle income 0.031 (.875) 0.060 (.712) −0.057 (.536)
High income 0.142 (.541) 0.222 (.247) −0.175 (.109)
Management 0.286 (.021) 0.287 (.003) −0.159 (.008)
Administrative support −0.285 (.214) −0.094 (.640) 0.044 (.693)
N 1,481   
χ 2 1245.653 [df = 600, p < .001]  
CFI 0.940   
RMSEA 0.027   
SRMR 0.032   
Note: Results from structural equation model with institutional fixed effects; p values in parentheses.
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institutions—management and leadership practices 
might vary inside institutions, and shape both PSM and 
willingness to sabotage, exit, or raise voice. This could 
lead to spurious correlations. To address this concern, 
we, first, assess whether our findings are robust to dif-
ferences in perceived monitoring and sanctioning of 
high-PSM bureaucrats (supplementary appendix 6). 
High-PSM bureaucrats might have performed better 
on the job and are thus less easily dismissed. As a re-
sult, they might be more able to engage in voice or 
sabotage without fear of sanctions. We thus add a con-
trol for perceived job stability (“It would be difficult 
to dismiss me from the public sector”; five-point scale 
from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). We find 
that bureaucrats who fear they can be easily dismissed 
are less willing to engage in sabotage (significant at 
the 1% level); we find no significant association be-
tween fear of dismissal and either exit or voice. At the 
same time, our PSM estimates remain significant (at 
the 1% level).
Figure 5. PSM dimensions and exit, voice, and sabotage.
Note: Estimated structural regression estimates for PSM dimensions from multivariate SEM, including all controls and ministry fixed effects. 
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18 In addition, PSM partially mediates the association between ethical 
leadership and voice.
Public servants with greater PSM might also per-
ceive that they are less closely monitored in their work 
than less “principled” bureaucratic agents. As a result, 
they might be more able to engage in sabotage without 
being found out. We thus add a control for supervision 
(agreement with the statement “My work is closely 
supervised.”). We find that those whose work is closely 
supervised are less willing to engage in guerrilla sabo-
tage (at the 1% level). Closer supervision has no sig-
nificant association with either voice or exit. Our PSM 
estimates remain significant (at the 1% level).
Second, we control for leadership practices of direct 
superiors, including transformational leadership (“My 
superior communicates and generates enthusiasm for 
the mission and vision of this organization”) and eth-
ical leadership (“My superior communicates clear 
ethical standards to subordinates”). This matters as 
leadership practices can enhance PSM (e.g., Paarlberg 
and Lavigna 2010) but might also reduce the will-
ingness of employees to sabotage (cf. O’Leary 2013), 
causing spurious correlations between PSM and sabo-
tage. We measure both indicators on a five-point scale, 
from “Never” to “Always or Almost Always.” PSM re-
mains a significant predictor in both models (at the 1% 
level) and fully mediates the effects of transformational 
leadership on exit, voice, and sabotage and the effect 
of ethical leadership on sabotage and exit (see supple-
mentary appendix 7).18
Third, given the our relatively low response rate, we 
assessed potential bias from non-response. We do so 
by exploiting survey implementation over time. Public 
servants who responded early to the survey were argu-
ably more motivated to respond than public servants 
who only responded after several follow-up emails 
before survey closure two months later. A decrease in 
average responses to PSM variables over time would 
imply that higher PSM public servants are more likely 
to respond to the survey, and potentially bias our find-
ings. We do not find this to be the case for any of the 
PSM items (supplementary appendix 9). While we lack 
data from those who never responded and thus cannot 
conclusively rule out non-response bias—and this is a 
limitation of this article—the data we have does not 
give us reason to believe that non-response biases our 
findings.
Fourth, we assessed the robustness of our find-
ings to alternative conceptualizations of sabotage. As 
aforementioned, O’Leary’s (2013) sabotage concept 
includes Brehm and Gates’ (1997) dissent shirking. 
To assess whether our findings hold using Brehm 
and Gates’ (1997) sabotage concept, we re-estimate 
the associations between PSM and sabotage with the 
“dissent shirking” measure (“I would, in private, try 
to disobey and not implement the policy”) excluded. 
Our findings remain robust (see supplementary ap-
pendix 8).
Discussion
For bureaucracies around the world, our core finding—
bureaucrats with greater PSM are more willing to en-
gage in voice, sabotage, and exit when tasked with 
implementing policies they perceive to be against the 
public interest—is good and bad news.
On an upside, it suggests that public service-
motivated bureaucracies act as stalwarts against “un-
principled” political principals. They are more willing 
to convince their principals to stop “unprincipled” 
policies. They are also more willing to sabotage them 
in implementation, by disobeying and failing to imple-
ment policies, convincing colleagues to do the same, 
undermining policy implementation inside their organ-
ization, and informing outside groups about societal 
harms of these policies. Our findings thus add to the 
literature on PSM and ethical behavior, underscoring 
that PSM is not only associated with ethical behav-
iors such as whistleblowing (e.g., Brewer and Selden 
1998), reporting of ethical problems to management 
(e.g., Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, and Schuster 2019), 
and honesty (e.g., Olsen et  al. 2019), but also guer-
rilla sabotage of “unprincipled” policies. This fur-
ther underscores the importance of PSM for public 
service ethics.
Our results, however, are also bad news for bur-
eaucracy in times of bad political government. Our 
findings suggest that “principled” bureaucracies 
with high-PSM bureaucrats come with an expiration 
date under “unprincipled” political principals. While 
turnover intent, of course, does not always translate 
into exit (e.g., Cho and Lewis 2012), our findings 
do suggest that, over time, there is a risk that public 
service-motivated bureaucrats leave when working 
under “unprincipled” political principals. This turns 
the typically negative relationship between PSM and 
turnover intent identified in prior work upside down 
(Ritz, Brewer, and Neumann 2016). With more public 
service-oriented bureaucrats more willing to leave, 
bureaucracies become more “unprincipled.” To illus-
trate, respondents who are willing to quit (at least 
often) when tasked with implementing “unprincipled” 
policies are also much more willing to engage in 
voice (79%) than those less frequently willing to quit 
(56%), and almost four times more willing to engage 
in sabotage (11%). In fact, those who do not contem-
plate exit (at least “Often”) and prefer to remain in 
the organization hardly engage in sabotage of unprin-
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principals a much freer hand in implementing un-
principled policies through a, then, more unprincipled 
bureaucracy. Political decay thus appears to trigger 
bureaucratic decay.
Our data also shed light on the particular public 
service motives accounting for different behavioral 
responses to “unprincipled” principals. In line with 
our theoretical argument, we find suggestive evi-
dence (in models controlling for one PSM dimension 
at a time) that all four PSM dimensions are associ-
ated with exit, voice, and with the notable exception 
of the association of CPV sabotage. For sabotage, 
we observe the largest and most robust association 
for APS. Compared to an affective motive (compas-
sion with those harmed by the policy), or a sense of 
self-sacrifice or a normative motive (internalization 
of public values), an instrumental motive thus ap-
pears to be most important for guerrilla bureaucrats: 
sabotaging “unprincipled” policies is part of mean-
ingful public service to them. By contrast, we find that 
self-sacrifice is the most robust predictor of “exit” 
in response to “unprincipled” principals (in models 
controlling for all PSM dimensions simultaneously). 
While inferences drawn from these models are only 
suggestive, our findings indicate that different values 
motivate different behavioral responses to “unprin-
cipled” principals. Those most willing to self-sacrifice 
are most willing to lose their jobs and exit. By con-
trast, those most motivated by meaningful public ser-
vice are most willing to sabotage.
Our robustness checks also suggest that PSM is 
an important, but not the only determinant of bur-
eaucratic responses to “unprincipled” policies. Our 
results also speak to the power of management and 
workplace incentives in shaping guerrilla bureaucracy. 
Bureaucrats whose work is closely supervised and who 
believe they can be easily dismissed, for instance, are 
less willing to engage in sabotage. Bureaucratic au-
tonomy matters for guerrilla sabotage. In that sense, 
our findings from Brazil differ from Hollibaugh, Miles, 
and Newswander’s (2020) study, who do not find a 
significant effect on the probability and type of retribu-
tion on guerrilla behavioral intent in the United States. 
Our data are, however, consistent with such an effect: 
bureaucrats who face a greater probability of being 
caught (as they are more closely supervised) and po-
tentially greater retribution (as they can be easily dis-
missed) are less likely to engage in guerrilla sabotage. 
The (somewhat surprising) lack of effect of punish-
ment incentives on guerrilla behavior in the US bur-
eaucracy thus does not appear to be generalizable to 
countries such as Brazil. This might be as in countries 
with weaker private employment alternatives such as 
Brazil, workplace incentives—in particular the incen-
tive to retain one’s job—may shape bureaucratic be-
havior more forcefully.
Transformational and ethical leadership practices 
are also found to be associated with voice, exit, and 
sabotage. Remarkably, though, these associations are 
largely indirect through PSM. This underscores, on 
the one hand, the importance of PSM to understand 
bureaucratic responses to “unprincipled” principals. 
On the other hand, it points to deeper antecedents of 
guerrilla behavior in public service. Transformational 
and ethical leaders in the public sector appear to en-
hance the PSM of their employees (see also Jensen 
and Bro 2018) and, in doing so, lay the groundwork 
for employees to become guerrilla bureaucrats when 
“unprincipled” political principals come into office. In 
other words, generating enthusiasm for the mission of 
the organization can lead to greater sabotage of prin-
cipals of that organization when those are perceived 
as “unprincipled.” This finding further nuances the lit-
erature on the behavioral implications of transform-
ational and ethical leadership inside government (e.g., 
Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014; Moynihan, Pandey, 
and Wright, 2012).
Our findings also speak to the behavior of public 
managers themselves when faced with “unprincipled” 
principals. Public managers are less likely to engage in 
sabotage, but more likely to engage in voice and exit. 
This suggests that managers differ from lower ranks 
in how they weigh competing ethical obligations when 
deciding how to respond to “unprincipled policies” (cf. 
Waldo 1980). On the one hand, they prioritize duty 
towards political principals to a greater extent by not 
sabotaging them. On the other, they prioritize duty to-
wards citizens to a greater extent by exiting the organ-
ization to not participate in implementing unprincipled 
policies—for which they plausibly bear greater respon-
sibility as senior officials—and by seeking to persuade 
principals to drop the policy. Sabotage is thus more the 
purview of middle and lower ranks, while voice and 
exit are the more typical behavioral responses of senior 
officials to unprincipled principals.
Conclusion
Recent years have seen a proliferation of populist gov-
ernments and governments with weak commitment to 
ethical values and the public interest. Freedom House 
(2021), for instance, estimates that 75% of the world’s 
population lives in countries experiencing demo-
cratic declines. For public administration research, 
this democratic backsliding puts a premium on, first, 
understanding how bureaucrats react to “unprin-
cipled” principals and policies; and, second, explaining 
why different bureaucrats react differently. Despite the 
centrality of these conundrums in contemporary gov-
ernance, hardly any quantitative public administra-
tion research has sought to resolve them. We address 
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an original measurement scale of bureaucratic guer-
rilla sabotage of “unprincipled” policies. We focus on 
one key explanator: PSM. We argue and find evidence 
that bureaucrats with greater PSM are more likely to 
engage in voice, sabotage, and exit when faced with 
“unprincipled policies.” Public service-motivated 
bureaucracies thus appear to be short-run stalwarts 
against “unprincipled” political principals. Over time, 
“principled bureaucrats” intend to depart, leaving “un-
principled” principals a freer hand to pursue policies 
against the public interest. Democratic backsliding 
thus risks leading to bureaucratic backsliding.
For democracies and bureaucracies around the 
world, this is a concerning finding. It suggests that, 
if “unprincipled” political principals are here to stay, 
their damage to the public interest will magnify: with 
longer rule, “unprincipled” political principals become 
less and less constrained in their policies by an increas-
ingly “unprincipled” bureaucracy.
Our findings underscore the importance of studying 
guerrilla bureaucracy and bureaucratic responses to 
“unprincipled” political principals. They also under-
score the feasibility of doing so, including by con-
structing a new measurement scale for guerrilla 
sabotage, which can be replicated in other contexts 
to compare the prevalence, determinants and conse-
quences of guerrilla bureaucracy across countries and 
time. We thus hope our findings encourage further 
quantitative research on guerrilla bureaucracy. Several 
avenues for further research stand out.
Most obviously, future research could assess exit, 
voice, and sabotage by public servants under “un-
principled” political principals outside Brazil. May 
we expect similar effects of PSM? Brazil’s Federal 
Government is marked by a traditional Weberian 
career civil service with strong tenure protections. 
Our findings are thus most plausibly generalizable 
to other Weberian career civil services, for instance 
in continental Europe. Whether they also travel to, 
for instance, politicized civil service systems in which 
bureaucratic agents are less autonomous from princi-
pals—or whether disincentives to sabotage due to, for 
instance, principals’ dismissal powers trump any effect 
of PSM—remains an empirical question.
Future research could also look to other determin-
ants of exit, voice, and sabotage of bureaucrats under 
“unprincipled” political principals. We found that 
other factors—including incentives emanating from 
monitoring and sanctioning, and leadership prac-
tices—matter. Future research could explore other 
determinants more thoroughly. It could also explore 
organizational dynamics and bureaucratic infighting 
surrounding guerrilla sabotage. For instance, how 
do low-PSM bureaucrats react to guerrilla sabotage 
of high-PSM bureaucrats? Do bureaucrats report to 
management when observing guerrillas, and does this 
depend on PSM? We cannot speak to these questions 
with our data, but believe future research ought to.
Similarly, future research could seek to quantita-
tively assess the ethical dilemmas and trade-offs facing 
guerrilla bureaucrats with greater nuance. Our meas-
urement is based on a scenario in which public ser-
vants are asked to implement a government policy that 
they are convinced is against the interest of the public 
and would cause society significant harm. The scen-
ario pits perceived bureaucratic obligations to serve 
society against obligations to be loyal to the political 
principal, in a case in which this principal is widely 
perceived to be “unprincipled.” Building on O’Leary 
(2013), future quantitative works could look in more 
depth at the underlying ethics of bureaucratic dissent, 
particularly in cases where principals are less uni-
versally considered “unprincipled.” In other words, 
beyond understanding what characteristics of bureau-
crats (as in our study) or what kind of policies (as in 
Hollibaugh, Miles, and Newswander 2020) lead bur-
eaucrats to rebel, it would be important to understand 
under what conditions bureaucrats’ sense that they 
should judge what “public interest” is, and how they 
determine “public interest” in times of bad govern-
ment in the first place, among several remaining con-
undrums. This might help also disentangle further the 
determinants of “constructive” and “destructive” devi-
ance and sabotage in government.
Lastly, future works could make methodological 
advances. Our inferences come from cross-sectional 
data and survey measures of behavioral intent. They 
thus have several limitations. First, we measure loy-
alty of bureaucrats towards unprincipled principals 
only indirectly (as a residual course of action in the 
absence of exit, voice and sabotage), rather than dir-
ectly. Second, as in the only prior quantitative study 
of guerrilla bureaucracy (Hollibaugh, Miles, and 
Newswander 2020), we measure guerrilla intent ra-
ther than behavior. Intent, of course, often predicts 
behavior, and turnover intent, for instance, is cor-
related with turnover behavior in prior studies (e.g., 
Cho and Lewis 2012). Panel data which traces, for 
instance, actual exit of bureaucrats, however, would 
provide firmer grounds. Second, we estimate correl-
ations rather than causal effects. Experiments which 
exogenously manipulate PSM to assess its effect on 
guerrilla behavior could provide evidence on causal 
effects (see, e.g., Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, and 
Schuster 2019). Third, as most other survey-based 
research in public administration, we cannot rule out 
common source bias and, in particular social desir-
ability bias (SDB), which might affect responses to 
both PSM and exit, voice, and sabotage (cf. Meier 
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consistently associated with three outcomes (exit, 
voice, and sabotage) which plausibly vary in social 
desirability, while other variables which may also be 
prone to SDB (such as leadership) have differential 
effects on them. This suggests that our core infer-
ences are not merely due to SDB, though we cannot 
conclusively rule out this possibility. Given that stat-
istical solutions to common source—and social de-
sirability—bias are typically ineffectual (cf. Favero 
and Bullock 2015), future studies of guerrilla bur-
eaucracy would do well to find administrative meas-
ures of sabotage. The challenge is clear: guerrilla 
sabotage is by definition clandestine and thus hard 
to track in administrative data.
Exciting ground to expand the quantitative study of 
guerrilla bureaucracy thus remains.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory online.
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